





Abstract		This	paper	argues	that	if	propensities	are	displayed	in	objective	physical	chances	then	the	appropriate	representation	of	these	chances	is	as	indexed	probability	functions.	Two	alternative	formal	models,	or	accounts,	for	the	relation	between	propensity	properties	and	their	chancy	or	probabilistic	manifestations,	in	terms	of	conditionals	and	conditional	probability	are	first	reviewed.	It	is	argued	that	both	confront	important	objections,	which	are	overcome	by	the	account	in	terms	of	indexed	probabilities.	A	number	of	further	advantages	of	the	indexed	probability	account	are	discussed,	which	suggest	that	it	is	promising	as	a	general	theory	of	objective	physical	chance.		The	paper	ends	with	a	discussion	of	the	indexical	character	of	the	objective	chances	that	are	grounded	in	propensities.			 1. Introduction	2. Conditional	Accounts		 2.1.	Conditionals		 2.2.	Conditional	probability	3.	The	Indexed	Probability	Account	of	Propensities	4.	Indexed	Chance	Functions:	History	and	Comparisons	5.	Some	Features	of	the	Indexed	Probability	Account	6.	Grounds	and	Indexes	for	Propensities	7.	Conclusions	Acknowledgements	References		 	
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(b)	for	all	outcomes	b.	Thus	the	simplest	model	would	assume	that	a	propensity	property	relates	to	its	probabilistic	manifestation	as	follows:	If	a	then	Prob	(b)	(where	Prob	(b)	is	the	full	distribution	function	over	outcomes):	‘If	the	coin	is	fair	then	the	probability	of	landing	heads	is	½	and	the	probability	of	landing	tails	is	½’;	‘if	the	material	is	made	of	radium,	then	the	probability	that	it	will	decay	during	the	next	hour	is	0.10’;	Etc.			 Hugh	Mellor	([2005],	pp.	53ff.)	has	proposed	a	conditional	account	of	the	relation	between	single	case	chances	of	events	and	frequency	statistics	observed	over	those	very	events.	Regardless	of	its	merits	this	account	may	be	considered	as	a	model	for	the	different	relation	between	propensities	and	chances.	Take	the	well-known	example	of	radioactive	decay.	Suppose	that	radium	atoms	have	a	chance	pt	of	decaying	within	t	years,	where	pt	is	well	known	to	be	the	inverse	of	an	exponential	function	of	time,	such	as:	 𝑃! = 1− 𝑒!!" .	Consider	then	the	law:	
€ 




Ch Dt x( ) 	of	decay	is	identified	with	its	‘having	some	categorical	basis	(such	as	a	nuclear	structure)	for	a	disposition	to	produce	a	hypothetical	limiting	frequency	pt	of	similar	R-atoms	decaying	within	t	years’	(Mellor	[2005],	p.	54).	The	assumption	that	there	is	such	a	categorical	basis	may	be	contested.	It	is	particularly	inappropriate	in	the	case	of	quantum	mechanics,	as	applied	to	the	most	fundamental	constituents	of	nature,	since	at	that	level	there	is	no	further	level	downwards	to	reduce	dispositional	properties	to.	Yet,	it	turns	out	to	be	an	unnecessary	assumption	in	this	context	anyway.	The	disposition	may	produce	the	frequency	without	any	recourse	to	the	categorical	basis,	and	we	may	simply	insist	that	the	law	
€ 
∀x Rx →Ch Dt x( ) = pt( ) 	holds,	where	we	now	assume	that	‘R’	denotes	merely	the	possession	of	the	relevant	disposition	whether	or	not	this	is	reducible	to	a	categorical	basis.				 We	can	thus	turn	without	further	ado	to	the	fundamental	issue	of	the	form	of	the	law	that,	on	this	account,	links	propensities	with	their	chancy	manifestations,	regardless	of	issues	of	reduction.	Mellor	does	not	stipulate	the	nature	of	the	relation	→	other	than	it	is	to	be	understood	as	the	conditional	‘if	R	(x)	then	
€ 
Ch Dt x( ) = pt ’.	Therefore,	this	law	has	exactly	the	form	advertised	for	the	relation	of	a	propensity	to	its	chancy	manifestations.	In	particular,	for	any	chance	set	up	x	it	must	be	the	case	that	‘if	x	has	a	then	Prob	(b)=	y’	is	true,	where	a	is	the	obtaining	of	the	propensity	for	x	and	Prob	(b)	=	y	is	the	probability	over	the	relevant	manifestation	property.	The	only	provisos	seem	to	be	that	i)	the	probability	is	understood	to	define	a	particular	chance	value	over	the	manifestation	properties,	and	ii)	the	manifestation	property	is	suitably	time-indexed.	Nothing	of	any	fundamental	importance	depends	on	these	provisos	(other	than	perhaps	the	assumption	that	chances	are	indeed	probabilities),	and	we	are	still	left	with	the	task	of	understanding	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	conditional	that	obtains	between	propensities	and	their	displays.		
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∀x Rx →Ch Dt x( ) = pt( ) .	Since	the	conditional	takes	the	form	already	discussed:	if	a	then	Prob	(b),	we	need	only	turn	this	into	the	corresponding	indexed	probability	formulation:	Proba	(b)=x,	where	a=R,	and	b=D.	The	only	loss	of	generality	incurred	is	the	actual	conditional	statement.	Nothing	as	regards	the	propensity	or	the	chance	that	displays	it	is	in	any	way	distinct:	The	possession	of	R	is	what	explains	and	grounds	the	chance	at	time	t,	and	this	is	best	represented	on	the	account	here	defended	as	the	indexed	function:	ProbR	(Dt)	=	p.	Thus	in	the	example	discussed	of	the	radium	atom,	the	solution	is	to	write:	
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Cr A Ch A( ) = x( )& E( ) = x .	It	quickly	became	clear	that	PP	is	nonetheless	implicitly	conditional.	It	is	first	of	all	conditional	on	time	since	both	the	credence	function	(Cr)	and	the	chance	function	(Ch)	are	understood	at	a	particular	time	t.	In	accordance	to	the	indexed	probability	account,	both	should	properly	carry	an	index.	Furthermore,	the	chance	function	is	to	be	evaluated	at	a	particular	world,	since	on	a	Humean	account	this	function	is	highly	sensitive	the	local	matters	of	fact	at	that	world.	And	indeed	Lewis	himself	formulates	the	principle	for	an	indexed	chance	function	as	follows	(Lewis	[1986],	p.	97):	
€ 
Chtw A( ) = Cr A HtwTw( ) ,	where	
€ 
Chtw A( ) 	is	the	probability	of	A	that	obtains	at	time	t	in	world	w;	Htw	is	the	history	of	the	world	w	up	to	time	t;	and	Tw	is	the	theory	of	chance	in	world	w	(i.e.	the	entire	set	of	true	history-to-chance	conditionals	in	this	world).		We	may	refer	to	this	as	the	original,	or	old,	principal	principle	(PPold),	which	Lewis	abandoned	(Lewis	[1994]),	under	pressure	from	the	so-called	problem	of	undermining	futures,	in	favour	of	one	he	called	the	new	principal	principle	(PPnew):
€ 




ChTw (A) = Cr A HtwTw( ).	PPprop	states	that,	in	the	absence	of	any	inadmissible	information	about	the	future,	conditional	credences	at	time	t	track	the	chances	displayed	by	the	propensities	that	ground	them	up	to	time	t.	15			
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